[clang] [AArch64][PAC] Support ptrauth builtins and -fptrauth-intrinsics. (PR #65996)

[David Spickett via cfe-commits]

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+Pointer Authentication
+======================
+
+.. contents::
+   :local:
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+Pointer authentication is a technology which offers strong probabilistic protection against exploiting a broad class of memory bugs to take control of program execution.  When adopted consistently in a language ABI, it provides a form of relatively fine-grained control flow integrity (CFI) check that resists both return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP) attacks.
+
+While pointer authentication can be implemented purely in software, direct hardware support (e.g. as provided by ARMv8.3) can dramatically lower the execution speed and code size costs.  Similarly, while pointer authentication can be implemented on any architecture, taking advantage of the (typically) excess addressing range of a target with 64-bit pointers minimizes the impact on memory performance and can allow interoperation with existing code (by disabling pointer authentication dynamically).  This document will generally attempt to present the pointer authentication feature independent of any hardware implementation or ABI.  Considerations that are implementation-specific are clearly identified throughout.
+
+Note that there are several different terms in use:
+
+- **Pointer authentication** is a target-independent language technology.
+
+- **ARMv8.3** is an AArch64 architecture revision of that provides hardware support for pointer authentication.  It is implemented on several shipping processors, including the Apple A12 and later.
+
+* **arm64e** is a specific ABI for (not yet fully stable) for implementing pointer authentication on ARMv8.3 on certain Apple operating systems.
+
+This document serves four purposes:
+
+- It describes the basic ideas of pointer authentication.
+
+- It documents several language extensions that are useful on targets using pointer authentication.
+
+- It presents a theory of operation for the security mitigation, describing the basic requirements for correctness, various weaknesses in the mechanism, and ways in which programmers can strengthen its protections (including recommendations for language implementors).
+
+- It will eventually document the language ABIs currently used for C, C++, Objective-C, and Swift on arm64e, although these are not yet stable on any target.
+
+Basic Concepts
+--------------
+
+The simple address of an object or function is a **raw pointer**.  A raw pointer can be **signed** to produce a **signed pointer**.  A signed pointer can be then **authenticated** in order to verify that it was **validly signed** and extract the original raw pointer.  These terms reflect the most likely implementation technique: computing and storing a cryptographic signature along with the pointer.  The security of pointer authentication does not rely on attackers not being able to separately overwrite the signature.
+
+An **abstract signing key** is a name which refers to a secret key which can used to sign and authenticate pointers.  The key value for a particular name is consistent throughout a process.
+
+A **discriminator** is an arbitrary value used to **diversify** signed pointers so that one validly-signed pointer cannot simply be copied over another.  A discriminator is simply opaque data of some implementation-defined size that is included in the signature as a salt.
+
+Nearly all aspects of pointer authentication use just these two primary operations:
+
+- ``sign(raw_pointer, key, discriminator)`` produces a signed pointer given a raw pointer, an abstract signing key, and a discriminator.
+
+- ``auth(signed_pointer, key, discriminator)`` produces a raw pointer given a signed pointer, an abstract signing key, and a discriminator.
+
+``auth(sign(raw_pointer, key, discriminator), key, discriminator)`` must succeed and produce ``raw_pointer``.  ``auth`` applied to a value that was ultimately produced in any other way is expected to immediately halt the program.  However, it is permitted for ``auth`` to fail to detect that a signed pointer was not produced in this way, in which case it may return anything; this is what makes pointer authentication a probabilistic mitigation rather than a perfect one.
----------------
DavidSpickett wrote:

Well let me put my perspective and you can take or leave it, it's not actually that important overall :)

If I read "a conforming implementation is expected to", I could substitute that with "must do". In fact, I'd probably just write it the second way to be 100% clear.

Also I'm used to dealing with PAuth without supporting ABIs and at an architecture level no exception is raised, so I'm biased. Any real user will likely be seeing this via an ABI that does raise exceptions.

https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/65996