[PATCH] D86329: Fix spelling errors in the doc

[YangZhihui via Phabricator via cfe-commits]

YangZhihui created this revision.
YangZhihui added reviewers: rsmith, craig.topper.
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Fix some spelling error in the doc


Repository:
  rG LLVM Github Monorepo

https://reviews.llvm.org/D86329

Files:
  clang/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.rst


Index: clang/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.rst
===================================================================
--- clang/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.rst
+++ clang/docs/ClangCommandLineReference.rst
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@
 
 .. option:: -emit-interface-stubs
 
-Generate Inteface Stub Files.
+Generate Interface Stub Files.
 
 .. option:: -emit-llvm
 
@@ -2136,7 +2136,7 @@
 
 .. option:: -fstack-protector, -fno-stack-protector
 
-Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. This uses a loose heuristic which considers functions vulnerable if they contain a char (or 8bit integer) array or constant sized calls to alloca , which are of greater size than ssp-buffer-size (default: 8 bytes). All variable sized calls to alloca are considered vulnerable. A function witha stack protector has a guard value added to the stack frame that is checked on function exit. The guard value must be positioned in the stack frame such that a buffer overflow from a vulnerable variable will overwrite the guard value before overwriting the function's return address. The reference stack guard value is stored in a global variable.
+Enable stack protectors for some functions vulnerable to stack smashing. This uses a loose heuristic which considers functions vulnerable if they contain a char (or 8bit integer) array or constant sized calls to alloca , which are of greater size than ssp-buffer-size (default: 8 bytes). All variable sized calls to alloca are considered vulnerable. A function with a stack protector has a guard value added to the stack frame that is checked on function exit. The guard value must be positioned in the stack frame such that a buffer overflow from a vulnerable variable will overwrite the guard value before overwriting the function's return address. The reference stack guard value is stored in a global variable.
 
 .. option:: -fstack-protector-all
 


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