[llvm-dev] HardenedBSD using speculative load hardening

[Shawn Webb via llvm-dev]

Hey all,

Just as an FYI, I've integrated -mspeculative-load-hardening into
HardenedBSD's userland build process. The integration is disabled by
default, but can be enabled by setting a src.conf(5) flag.

I hope to perform some benchmarks soon. I'm especially curious how
speculative load hardening affects bhyve, FreeBSD's (and
HardenedBSD's) hypervisor. Would anyone be interested in the results?

Are there any other OSes applying llvm's speculative load hardening to
such a broad range of userspace applications? It'd be neat to compare
results and testing methodologies.

Thanks,

-- 
Shawn Webb
Cofounder / Security Engineer
HardenedBSD

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