[LLVMdev] [PATCH] Protection against stack-based memory corruption errors using SafeStack
Volodymyr Kuznetsov
vova.kuznetsov at epfl.ch
Tue Nov 4 11:14:19 PST 2014
Hi Kostya,
Thanks for your comments! We are great fans of AddressSanitizer ourselves,
we use it extensively and also plan to contribute to it in the future as
well.
Our understanding is that ASAN's main use case is during testing; the goal
of SafeStack is to run in production, so it therefore offers a specific
form of protection that can be delivered at near-zero overhead. In
particular, we don't focus much on bug detection, but rather on making it
much harder to write exploits against code that has bugs. With the
SafeStack enabled, the distance between on-stack buffer that might overflow
and the return addresses (or sensitive spilled registers) that the attacker
might want to overwrite becomes much less predictable (or even randomized,
if ASLR is employed), as they're now stored on two separate stacks.
Our current SafeStack implementation is just a first step in that
direction. In the future, we plan to further protect the regular stack
using leak-proof randomization (as described in our paper): the regular
stack will be allocated at a random offset and the instrumentation will
ensure that neither %rsp value nor any other pointers to the regular stack
would ever be stored on the heap or on the unsafe stack. This would mostly
require changes to the libc/glibc to instrument setjmp/longjmp, stack
unwinding, and other code that accesses %rsp directly. With such protection
in place, overwriting the return addresses or pivoting the stack would
become nearly impossible in practice, along with many ROP attacks that are
based on it.
Please find answers to some of your specific questions below:
On 4 Nov 2014, at 00:36, Kostya Serebryany <kcc at google.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Volodymyr,
>
> disclaimer: my opinion is biased because I've co-authored AddressSanitizer
> and SafeStack is doing very similar things.
>
> The functionality of SafeStack is limited in scope, but given the near-zero
> overhead and non-zero benefits I'd still like to see it in LLVM trunk.
> SafeStack, both the LLVM and compiler-rt parts, is very similar to what we
> do in AddressSanitizer, so I would like to see more code reuse, especially
> in compiler-rt.
>
> That would be great indeed and could simplify the SafeStack code in
several places. We will try to figure our how to do it without increasing
the overhead or complexity of the SafeStack (e.g., without requiring to
link with pthreads, etc.).
> What about user-visible interface? Do we want it to be more similar to
> asan/tsan/msan/lsan/ubsan/dfsan flags, e.g. -fsanitize=safe-stack ?
>
> We've picked the -fsafe-stack option as it feels more similar to
-fstack-protector option, whose usage model we follow. The -fsanitize
options feel more associated with testing/debugging than the production use
(or at least we perceive it this way).
> I am puzzled why you are doing transformations on the CodeGen level, as
> opposed to doing it in LLVM IR pass.
>
> As I explained on Phabricator, we want to apply the SafeStack
transformation as the very last step before code generation, to make sure
that it operate on the final stack layout. Doing so earlier might prevent
some other optimizations from succeeding (as it e.g., complicates the alias
analysis, breaks mem2reg pass, etc.) or might force the SafeStack pass move
more objects to the unsafe stack than necessary (e.g., if the operations on
such objects that the SafeStack considered potentially unsafe are actually
later optimized away). In principle, in some pathological cases, it might
even break correctness, e.g., if the SafeStack decides to keep some object
on the normal stack, but the subsequent optimization or instrumentation
passes add potentially unsafe operations on such objects.
> LLVM code base is c++11 now, so in the new code please use c++11, at least
> where it leads to simpler code (e.g. "for" loops).
>
> Great point! I've fixed the code to use c++11 (along with many other
issues raised on the Phabricator) and will update the patch ASAP.
> compiler-rt part lacks tests. same for clang part.
>
> Yes, we plan to eventually add such tests in the future.
> Are you planing to support this feature in LLVM long term?
>
> We certainly want to see SafeStack used in the real world and will do our
best to support it in LLVM. That said, please keep in mind that we're just
a small group in a research institution with very limited resources, so we
hardly can make any promises and would greatly appreciate any help from the
community on supporting and improving the SafeStack.
> You say that SafeStack is a superset of stack cookies.
> What are the downsides?
> You at least increase the memory footprint by doubling the stack sizes.
> You also add some (minor) incompatibility and the need for the new
> attributes to disable SafeStack.
> What else?
>
> Please see an earlier email
<http://lists.cs.uiuc.edu/pipermail/llvmdev/2014-November/078475.html> for
a discussion of the memory footprint. The main (minor) incompatibility that
we observed were related to the mark-and-sweep garbage collection
implementation for C++ that we saw in Chromuim: we had to change it to scan
the unsafe stack as well (in addition to the regular stack) when searching
for pointers to the heap. The change was rather small and well isolated
though, and pretty much aligned with already existing support for
AddressSanitizer in that garbage collector.
> I've also left a few specific comments in phabricator.
>
> Thank you for the comments! We plan to submit the updated patch ASAP.
- Volodymyr Kuznetsov
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