[PATCH] D76101: DO NOT MERGE - [x86][seses] SESES ALL CHANGES

Zola Bridges via Phabricator via llvm-commits llvm-commits at lists.llvm.org
Thu Mar 12 15:12:09 PDT 2020


zbrid created this revision.
Herald added subscribers: llvm-commits, jfb, hiraditya, mgorny.
Herald added a project: LLVM.
zbrid added a parent revision: D75939: [x86][seses] Introduce SESES pass for LVI.

This patch is to make it easier to test all the changes for SESES
together. This is not expected to be committed upstream.

[x86][seses] Introduce SESES pass for LVI

This is an implementation of Speculative Execution Side Effect
Suppression which is intended as a last resort mitigation against Load
Value Injection, LVI, a newly disclosed speculative execution side
channel vulnerability.

One pager:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/load-value-injection

Deep dive:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection

The mitigation consists of a compiler pass that inserts an LFENCE before
each memory read instruction, memory write instruction, and the first
branch instruction in a group of terminators at the end of a basic
block. The goal is to prevent speculative execution, potentially based
on misspeculated conditions and/or containing secret data, from leaking
that data via side channels embedded in such instructions.

This is something of a last-resort mitigation: it is expected to have
extreme performance implications and it may not be a complete mitigation
due to trying to enumerate side channels.

In addition to the full version of the mitigation, this patch
implements three flags to turn off part of the mitigation. These flags
are disabled by default. The flags are not intended to result in a
secure variant of the mitigation. The flags are intended to be used by
users who would like to experiment with improving the performance of
the mitigation. I ran benchmarks with each of these flags enabled in
order to find if there was any room for further optimization of LFENCE
placement with respect to LVI.

Performance Testing Results

When applying this mitigation to BoringSSL, we see the following
results. These are a summary/aggregation of the performance changes when
this mitigation is applied versus when no mitigation is applied.

Fully Mitigated vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.071 (Note: This can be read as the ops/s of the mitigated
program was 7.1% of the ops/s of the unmitigated program.)
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.063
Quartile 3
0.077
Maximum
0.230

[x86][seses] No LFENCEs in basic blocks w/o loads

Add a flag to the x86 Speculative Execution Side Effect Suppression Pass
that allows users to turn off adding LFENCEs in basic blocks with no
loads.

This is a part of a set of flags that can be used to experiment with
optimizing this mitigation for Load Value Injection.

One pager on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/load-value-injection

Deep dive on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection

Results of my performance testing

I ran the BoringSSL benchmarks which run many cryptographic operations
and reports the number of operations per second completed in a given
time.

Modified Mitigation vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.073 (This can be read as the geomean ops/s of the mitigated program
was 7.3% of the ops/s of the unmitigated program. Similar below.)
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.066
Quartile 3
0.081
Maximum
0.234

Fully Mitigated vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.071
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.063
Quartile 3
0.077
Maximum
0.230

[x86][seses] No lfences in bb w/ 1 load and 0 stores

Add a flag to the x86 Speculative Execution Side Effect Suppression Pass
that allows users to turn off adding LFENCEs in basic blocks with a
single load and no stores.

This is a part of a set of flags that can be used to experiment with
optimizing this mitigation for Load Value Injection.

One pager on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/load-value-injection

Deep dive on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection

Results of performance testing

I ran the BoringSSL benchmarks which run many cryptographic operations
and reports the number of operations per second completed in a given
time.

Modified Mitigation vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.073 (This can be read as the geomean ops/s of the mitigated program
was 7.3% of the ops/s of the unmitigated program. Similar below.)
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.064
Quartile 3
0.081
Maximum
0.232

Fully Mitigated vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.071
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.063
Quartile 3
0.077
Maximum
0.230

[x86][seses] Don't LFENCE data invariant insts

Add a flag to the x86 Speculative Execution Side Effect Suppression Pass
that allows users to turn off LFENCEing data invariant instructions.

Note that the list currently used by this flag does not include
information about vector instructions. That information can be added in
the future with no issues. The fact those instructions have not been
added to this list mean that it's also likely that the improvements
shown in the following performance data is understated.

This is a part of a set of flags that can be used to experiment with
optimizing this mitigation for Load Value Injection.

One pager on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/software-guidance/load-value-injection

Deep dive on Load Value Injection:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/deep-dive-load-value-injection

Performance Testing Results

I ran the BoringSSL benchmarks which run many cryptographic operations
and reports the number of operations per second completed in a given
time.

Modified Mitigation vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.129 (This can be read as the geomean ops/s of the mitigated program
was 12.9% of the ops/s of the unmitigated program. Similar below.)
Minimum
0.058
Quartile 1
0.104
Median
0.112
Quartile 3
0.139
Maximum
0.459

Fully Mitigated vs Baseline
Geometric mean
0.071
Minimum
0.041
Quartile 1
0.060
Median
0.063
Quartile 3
0.077
Maximum
0.230


Repository:
  rG LLVM Github Monorepo

https://reviews.llvm.org/D76101

Files:
  llvm/lib/Target/X86/CMakeLists.txt
  llvm/lib/Target/X86/X86.h
  llvm/lib/Target/X86/X86SpeculativeExecutionSideEffectSuppression.cpp
  llvm/lib/Target/X86/X86TargetMachine.cpp
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/O0-pipeline.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/O3-pipeline.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression-omit-branch-lfences.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression-omit-lfence-in-bb-with-one-load-no-stores.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression-omit-lfence-in-bb-without-loads.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression-only-first-lfence.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression-only-lfence-non-const.ll
  llvm/test/CodeGen/X86/speculative-execution-side-effect-suppression.ll

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