[cfe-commits] strncpy checker - proposed patch

Lenny Maiorani lenny at Colorado.EDU
Fri Feb 4 16:39:50 PST 2011

On Feb 3, 2011, at 3:13 PM, Lenny Maiorani wrote:

> On Dec 21, 2010, at 9:52 AM, Ted Kremenek wrote:
>> Hi Lenny,
>> Thank you for your patience.  Overall the patch looks great, but I'm a little confused about the following section:
>>>    // Get the string length of the source.
>>>    SVal strLength = getCStringLength(C, state, srcExpr, srcVal);
>>> +  if (isStrncpy) {
>>> +    // Check if the number of bytes to copy is less than the size of the src
>>> +    const Expr *lenExpr = CE->getArg(2);
>>> +    strLength = state->getSVal(lenExpr);
>>> +  }
>>> +
>>>    // If the source isn't a valid C string, give up.
>>>    if (strLength.isUndef())
>>>      return;
>> This looks like an intermingling of logic that it's not clear should compose is this way.
>> At the beginning we (a) fetch a value for 'strLength', then (b) overwrite that value if 'isStrncpy' is true, and then (c) we check if strLength is undefined.   Both (a) and (b) look like competing logic.  If they are truly mutually exclusive, I rather have one, but not both, get computed.  This logic also looks slightly pessimistic, as the length of the string can be smaller than the max number of bytes specified to strncpy().  If the value retrieved at (a) is less than the value retrieved at (b), should we use the strLength from (a) and not (b)?  I can see the argument to always use the most pessimistic value, but then our error reporting should probably reflect that 'size_t n' argument to strncpy() is too large, and not necessarily that we have a buffer overflow.  That would make it clearer to the user what they actually need to fix in their code (i.e., while it might not be a buffer overflow, it is one waiting to happen, etc.).
>> Overall, this looks great.  I'd just like to iron these last details out a bit (and document the final design decision in the code itself with comments) so it's clear the checker is always doing what you intend and that the user understands why they are getting a warning for their code.
>> Cheers,
>> Ted
> After a hiatus, I am back. Ted, you were correct. My patch was pessimistic. I have modified it to accurately reflect whether or not there is a buffer overflow. Now, it compares the size of the src buffer and the value of the size_t and takes the smaller. See attached patch.
> Maybe there should be an additional check to see if the size_t (3rd arg) is larger than the size of dst. This would be more of a potential logic error waiting to happen when the code changed sometime in the future. This patch does not contain that.
> -Lenny
> <strncpy-checker.diff>
>        __o
>      _`\<,_
>     (*)/ (*)
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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This patch extends my previous patch to also check for a separate pessimistic case. It ensures that the size_t n (3rd arg to strncpy()) is less than the size of the destination buffer. It contains a different warning message than the other strict buffer overruns since this one is not actually a buffer overrun, only a chance of a buffer overrun in the future.


    (*)/ (*)

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